Kenya: Proximity to Somalia a Threat to Security
By Staff Writer
Nairobi-- Kenya’s proximity to and troubled relationship with Somalia and the militant Al-Shabaab movement threaten its security and stability, necessitating sound strategies to combat Islamist radicalisation that go beyond counter-terrorism.
Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation the latest Crisis Group briefing, examines the spillover of Somalia’s growing Islamism and radicalisation into the neighbouring country. Al-Shabaab, which in the last four years has built a formidable and secretive cross-border support infrastructure and network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, is trying to radicalise and recruit youths, often capitalising on long-standing grievances against the central state. The October decision of Kenya to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia’s Juba Valley to fight the group underscores the threat that the government perceives it faces from Somalia’s insurgency and growing Islamist radicalism.
“Al-Shabaab’s swift rise to relative dominance in southern Somalia has added to concerns about radicalisation in Kenya and beyond”, says Abdullahi Boru Halakhe, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Analyst. “Despite recent military setbacks, growing internal schisms and public backlash, it remains a major threat to Somalia’s and the region’s security and stability”.
Kenyan Somalis – some 2.4 million of the country’s 38.6 million population according to the 2009 census – have been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades. A history of insurgency, misrule and repression and lack of basic services in the North Eastern Province have posed an additional threat. Moreover, Somalia’s two decades of conflict have also had a largely negative effect on the province and Kenyan Somalis.
The deployment of troops to Somalia may jeopardise benefits produced by a modest affirmative action policy that is opening opportunities for ethnic Somalis in Kenya and drive more members of the politically important minority into Al-Shabaab’s arms. There is also concern that the decision to join the fighting in Somalia country may lead to more terror attacks inside Kenya.
Partly due to lack of resources, government counter-terrorism efforts continue to focus on policing and border security, but more needs to be done both with programs designed to counter radicalisation as well as with those that seek to de-radicalise persons who have already joined radical groups. There is a link, but counter-terrorism tactics aimed only at stopping Al-Shabaab and other militant groups should not become the only official response to radicalisation. Reducing the appeal of Islamism and persuading people already in radical organisations to leave should be a priority. Moreover, the government should recognise that a draconian crackdown on Kenyan Somalis, or Kenyan Muslims in general, would radicalise more individuals and add to the threat of domestic terrorism.
“It would be a profound mistake to view the challenge solely through a counter-terrorism lens. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation are long-term processes needing tact and patience”, says EJ Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. “Radicalisation will be a problem long after the physical threat of Al-Shabaab terrorism subsides”
Somalia’s growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya. The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalise and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalising on long-standing grievances against the central state. This problem could grow more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia. Radicalisation is a grave threat to Kenya’s security and stability. Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies before it is too late must be a priority. It would be a profound mistake, however, to view the challenge solely through a counter-terrorism lens.
Kenya’s North Eastern Province emerged as a distinct administrative entity dominated by ethnic Somalis after independence. It is, by most accounts, the worst victim of unequal development. A history of insurgency, misrule and repression, chronic poverty, massive youth unemployment, high population growth, insecurity, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services, have combined to produce some of the country’s bleakest socio-economic and political conditions.
Two decades of conflict in neighbouring Somalia have also had a largely negative effect on the province and Kenyan Somalis. The long and porous border is impossible to police effectively. Small arms flow across unchecked, creating a cycle of demand that fuels armed criminality and encourages clans to rearm. Somali clan-identity politics, animosities and jingoism frequently spill over into the province, poisoning its politics, undermining cohesion and triggering bloody clashes. The massive stream of refugees into overflowing camps creates an additional strain on locals and the country. Many are now also moving to major urban centres, competing with other Kenyans for jobs and business opportunities triggering a strong official and public backlash against Somalis, both from Somalia and Kenya.
At the same time, ethnic Somalis have become a politically significant minority. Reflecting their growing clout, Somali professionals are increasingly appointed to important government positions. The coalition government has created a ministry to spearhead development in the region. A modest affirmative action policy is opening opportunities in higher education and state employment. To most Somalis this is improvement, if halting, over past neglect. But the deployment of troops to Somalia may jeopardise much of this modest progress. Al-Shabaab or sympathisers have launched small but deadly attacks against government and civilian targets in the province; there is credible fear a larger terror attack may be tried elsewhere to undermine Kenyan resolve and trigger a security crackdown that could drive more Somalis, and perhaps other Muslims, into the movement’s arms.
Crisis Group recommends that the Kenyan government should recognise that a blanket or draconian crackdown on Kenyan Somalis, or Kenyan Muslims in general, would radicalise more individuals and add to the threat of domestic terrorism. The security forces have increased ethnic profiling but otherwise appear relatively restrained – especially given past behaviour; still, counter-terrorism operations need to be carefully implemented and monitored, also by neutral observers. The government should also develop effective, long-term counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies. A link exists between radicalisation and terrorism, but counter-terrorism tactics aimed only at stopping Al-Shabaab and other militant groups should not become the only official response. Counter-radicalisation – reducing the appeal of radicalism – and de-radicalisation – persuading people who are already in radical organisations to leave them – are long-term processes that require tact and patience.