South Sudan: Militias Pose Threats in Post-Referendum Period
By Staff Writer
JUBA---South Sudan’s remarkably peaceful referendum momentarily assuaged concerns about violence in the region, but outbreaks of intense fighting in Jonglei on February 9 and 10 that left hundreds dead, and in the flashpoint town of Malakal on February 4, provide stark reminders of the tensions that remain. This is according to a report by Enough Project, the Washington-based anti-genocide lobby group. The report---South Sudan’s Militias---provides an overview of the state of play among South Sudan’s militias, which continue to be a critical challenge to securing a peaceful separation between North and South Sudan, and to the formation of a stable new state.
One reason why the referendum took place relatively peacefully in flashpoint regions was the concerted effort on the part of the South Sudanese government to reconcile with breakaway militia leaders beforehand. The olive branch that was offered appeared to be accepted by a number of key militia leaders. But just weeks after the announcement of the South’s overwhelming preference for secession, intense fighting broke out once more, amid allegations of support from Khartoum for the dissidents.
“Significant hurdles remain before peace in South Sudan can be assured for the long-term”, says the report.
According to the report, any future peace agreements between the South Sudanese government and dissident elements will face serious challenges in their implementation and remain vulnerable to security threats from spoilers both from Khartoum and from splintering within the militias themselves. Operationally, integrating militia members into the SPLA is complex and will come at a long-term cost for a government that must eventually reduce the size of its military and disarm its civilian population.
Although there is a deep and explicit desire among southerners to reconcile with armed non-state actors, the situation is extremely fragile and high levels of distrust prevail. Ultimately, confidence-building and addressing the root causes of conflict in the South takes time and action, and cannot be achieved simply through paper contracts. U.N. representative
David Gressly has warily remarked, “The signature of the peace agreement is only the first step. Implementing it is the hard part.”
Some of the key elements in a comprehensive strategy for neutralizing militia groups as suggested by Enough Project include unpalatable but necessary strategy of co-option of militia leaders through negotiations that offer integration into the GOSS army as well as other perquisites. A more fulsome disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programme for rank and file militia members who wish to leave military service, and integration into the southern Sudanese army for those that want to remain.
The report says that another strategy would involve a demonstrated commitment by the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement toward inclusive governance, in the form of a democratic constitutional review process and independent political party and civil society development.
It notes that the current relationship between the southern government and militia elements is a product of Sudan’s unique social, economic, and political history. Constantly shifting alliances among and within the militias further complicate efforts to understand these dynamics and identify individual agendas. Coalitions form and break for many reasons
including but not limited to tribal affiliations, turf gains, recruitment drives, and resource control.
Although all parties have publicly supported a cessation of hostilities, reconciliation efforts remain fragile and vulnerable to spoilers, as seen in the most recent violence. Some militia leaders envision themselves in positions of power in the government or armed forces, while others are looking for substantial payouts for their loyalty, and are interested only in personal gain. The level of support and number of men that each militia leader commands is unclear, and the effectiveness of each group in combat has varied. All have been very opaque in terms of their overall goals, and there is considerable variation in how each group’s agenda can be interpreted.
It is instructive that ever since President Kiir issued an official pardon to all armed groups in South Sudan, GOSS and the SPLA have indicated a willingness to overlook past atrocities and welcome dissident elements back into the government and army. GOSS’s stance has remained in line with the October amnesty that President Kiir granted to all militia operators in South Sudan to reconcile these armed elements, and welcome them back into society as brothers.
“Whether the latest incidents will change the southern government’s tactic remains to be seen”, the report says.
Still, challenges abound. The olive branch extended by the South Sudanese government to militias in the months leading up to the referendum was a positive step toward the goal of reconciliation in South Sudan. But as demonstrated by recent violence, the South Sudanese government has considerable work to do before removing the threat to stability that armed groups pose.
The report notes that divisions and weak command and control within many of the militia groups may compromise the implementation of any reconciliation agreement with the southern government. Some of the militia leaders have experienced difficulty maintaining control over their field-based units, while among many militia rank and file, there is a sense of disconnect from, and even distrust of, their commanders.