Kenya: Uhuru Can Use Violence to Achieve Power-WikiLeaks

By staff writer

Kenya’s Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta appears to be working towards a presidential run in 2012. Interestingly, while Kenyatta seems to appreciate the need to be seen as pro-reform, the potential for him to foment violence to achieve political ends cannot be ruled out (he is reportedly a key figure on the list of suspected perpetrators of post-election violence). This is according to leaked diplomatic cables published by the whistle blowing website WikiLeaks.

 While many have pointed out that replacing President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, by another Kikuyu, would be unlikely due to anti-Kikuyu sentiments prevalent across much of Kenyan society, Kenyatta may be encouraged to attempt a presidential run due to shifting political dynamics that make potential challengers seem weak. 

Kenyatta is taking steps that are clearly intended to bolster his political standing and mobilize support. His appointment as Finance Minister was seen by many as an implicit endorsement by Kibaki; it provides a powerful platform for Kenyatta to pursue presidential ambitions. The budget which he recently submitted to Parliament in the last financial year has virtually bought many parliamentarians as a result of vast expansion of the funds designated for the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). No budget presentation has ever been greeted with such enthusiasm by parliamentarians. (It is important to note that expansion of the CDF, if used transparently) and therein lies the rub) can serve a legitimate purpose of helping stimulate the economy through infrastructure projects; the economy is suffering greatly due to the aftermath of the post-election violence and the world financial crisis.

Kikuyu political dynamics seem to be favoring Kenyatta. There has been an emerging realization among Kikuyu professionals, progressive politicians, and others that it would not be healthy for the nation or wise politically to seek to have another Kikuyu replace Kibaki.  That said, however, many Kikuyus, including the still dominant political class, fear the potential consequences of electing a non-Kikuyu (the concerns include worries about their economic and political interests, including the potential for another ethnic group to exploit anti-corruption efforts against them). Kenyatta is slowly but steadily emerging as the most likely potential presidential designee of the Kikuyus — should they decide to back a candidate for president. Other contenders are not gaining traction. Minister of Security Saitoti is considered too old, not charismatic, and he is tainted by the Goldenberg corruption scandal.  Kikuyu dissident Martha Karua, the former Minister of Justice and head of the NARC-K party within the PNU, has not gained wide support in the Kikuyu Central Province. (Vice President Musyoka, the nominal head of the Kamba community, which is closely related to the Kikuyu community, remains a potential standard-bearer if at the end of the day the Kikuyus decide that they should not field their own candidate. However, that would be seen as a Kikuyu-Kamba condominium, which might well be worse than a straight-out bid by Kenyatta if he can get crucial support from the Kalenjin community.)

While Kibaki will not play a decisive role in designating his preferred successor, his standing as the principal Kikuyu elder and the power that State House wields, mean that obtaining his support is important. A number of sources report close contacts between Kibaki and Kenyatta, and between those two and William Ruto, a potential ally. Kibaki,s naming of Kenyatta as Finance Minister was seen as at least giving Kenyatta the platform to make a play for leadership.

Tentative, behind the scenes cooperation between Kenyatta and Eldoret North MP William Ruto is focused on a deal whereby Ruto uses his influence among Kalenjins to facilitate the reintegration of the Kikuyu internally displaced persons in Rift Valley; in return, Ruto would get a significant share of important economic positions for his Kalenjin political allies. What is particularly problematic in a potential Kenyatta-Ruto alliance is who would get top billing on the presidential ticket, but there is some sense that Ruto might accept the position of vice president or prime minister, and thus prepare the ground for a presidential run in 2017.(Ruto is in his 40s.)

Yet another indication that Kenyatta may be preparing the ground for a presidential run is his tacit support for the creation of a national youth movement. Struck by U.S. outreach efforts to grassroots youth movements in support of the reform agenda, parliamentarians and other politicians are scrambling to try to co-opt the youth.  One of the most important of these efforts is the plan underway by Kibaki,s son Jimmy and several parliamentarians to launch a national youth movement on July 4. Although Jimmy has publicly claimed this is intended to push for change across the political spectrum, this is a ridiculous assertion given Jimmy,s position as a charter member of the vested interests.

If he decides to pursue the presidency, Kenyatta has several major strengths, but these are balanced and potentially offset by important weaknesses. Kenyatta is bright and charming,even charismatic. He is enormously wealthy, and therefore has not had to engage in corruption. Although his wealth is the inheritance from his father’s corruption, the Kenyatta family still holds a special status. Kenyatta’s liabilities are at least as important as his strengths. He drinks too much and is not a hard worker (though he surprised everyone by the acuity of the budget, which reportedly resulted from some tough work over long hours).

 Perhaps most importantly, Kenyatta has been closely linked to the Mungiki (which emerged in the aftermath of the Mau Mau and began as a movement in defense of Kikuyu traditional values, but which has long since morphed into a well-organized mafia-style criminal organization). The reason that Kenyatta is assumed to be on the Waki Commission list of suspected perpetrators of post-election violence is his fund-raising to support Mungiki violent actions against Kalenjins during the post-election violence. Some reports indicate that Kenyatta has tried to distance himself from the Mungiki. (The links between the Mungiki and various Kikuyu politicians are at best murky.)

Kenyatta may see shifting political dynamics as opening the way for a presidential run.  Odinga is increasingly perceived as feckless, unable or unwilling to govern effectively and move forward the reform agenda. There is growing disillusionment within his camp (as conveyed by key interlocutors of Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement, ODM, party to the Ambassador).  Odinga,s being seen as in a weakened position may be wishful thinking given his political resilience and the fact that he could yet emerge as a reformer, but he has clearly lost significant popular support. The ODM seems both directionless and less united than before.

“Although talk of calculations with respect to the 2012 presidential election seems very premature, the reality is that politicians are already maneuvering with that in mind. Those considerations will influence their calculations with respect to the reform agenda. The popular dynamic in favour of reform will influence politicians, behavior in a positive direction to some degree, but this will be weighed against considerations of ethnic alliances, fund-raising, and personal politics. Continued intensive U.S. pressure for implementation of reforms will help drive considerations in the right direction towards reform steps,” says US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger.