Uganda: No Easy Task Disarming the LRA
By Staff Writer
KAMPALA---US President Barack Obama is facing a great challenge. After his strategy to disarm the LRA and its reclusive leader Joseph Kony was approved by the Senate last year, the reality is dawning on him: that it will be no easy task disarming these ruthless combatants. A new report released by Enough Project, the Washington-based anti-genocide lobby group, describes the challenges of dissolving the LRA’s band of fighters who have waged a campaign of violence against civilians in central Africa for over two decades. Based on interviews with former LRA combatants, the report—Too Far from Home-- provides a unique insight into the rebellion, including reasons why fighters leave the ranks, and the risks and challenges they face in doing so.
Though a number of fighters have already defected, they still face various hazards for abandoning the rebellion. One fighter who escaped north of Western Bahr el Ghazal state in Sudan said: “Kony lied to us when he said we were fighting for the rights of our people in Uganda. We were too far from home.”
According to the report, the process of defection brings about countless perils. Men, women, and children formerly in the LRA risk beatings and death if caught by LRA commanders. Once outside of the reach of their commanders, former LRA risk being lynched by the local populations of Congo, Sudan, and CAR as well as being mistreated by the regional armies.
“The majority of former combatants who survive all the hazards associated with abandoning the rebellion are pressured into joining the Ugandan army to fight against the remaining LRA with no training and no salary. Such actions are unethical and potentially illegal. Despite statements lauding the use of former LRA combatants, the practice of pressuring former combatants to fight for the Ugandan army should end”, the report says.
Pressures range from denying amnesty to outright intimidation. Contrary to commonly held assumptions, the strategic value of former LRA fighters is minimal especially after they are kept for months in Ugandan army bases and “safe houses” in Kampala. Enough Project argues that there exists no legitimate reason for the Ugandan army to use former abductees, led by some of the same commanders formerly in the LRA, to do the job of the national army with no training and no pay.
Many of the former fighters able to reach Uganda are reluctant to return to their communities, preferring instead to relocate to major towns in northern Uganda. Fearing retribution from community members they were forced to attack when in the LRA and lacking economic opportunities there, people formerly with the LRA remain “far from home” even when they are physically in Uganda.
The report describes the experiences of former LRA who have recently returned to northern Uganda, explaining their reasons for leaving the LRA ranks, challenges faced throughout the demobilization period, the current status of the remaining LRA groups in Sudan, Congo, CAR, and recommendations to align existing efforts and provide greater incentives to encourage more LRA fighters to defect, disarm and come home.
Scattered in small groups that operate over vast territories in Congo, Sudan, and CAR, the LRA is no longer the highly centralized organization it used to be. Since Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT) of December 2008 when the Ugandan army attacked LRA bases in DRC, LRA commanders have separated from one another. Kony operates with a small group of fighters while his top commanders Okot Odhiambo and Caesar Achellam move close to him. By October 2010, Kony was reportedly in southern Darfur and by the beginning of December 2010, he was moving back into CAR and possibly headed for Congo.
Despite facing countless risks, many combatants and “wives” formerly with the LRA decide to leave, risking almost certain death in the process. Reasons for leaving the LRA abound, but general disillusionment with the organization’s ideology ranked high with those who have recently returned.
“We were deceived by our commanders,” said a former fighter. “They initially said we would go to Sudan to get guns and come back to Uganda to overthrow the government, then we were told to go to Congo to get guns and come back to Uganda, then to go to CAR to get guns and come back and then we were near Darfur with the same story. They were just lying to us.”
But obstacles to leaving the LRA ranks still abound. Often, the combatants have a better chance of surviving by staying in the LRA rather than leaving. The first risk people in the LRA face when contemplating leaving the ranks is death if they are caught trying to escape. C.A., a fighter in a LRA group operating southeast of CAR, decided to leave with his wife and two children in July 2010. Other fighters pursued them, killing one of his children and capturing his wife. Back in Uganda, C.A., possibly suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, is certain his wife was killed to discourage others from leaving. “It is the way of the LRA,” he said.
After escaping, many have to overcome fears associated with years of indoctrination in the LRA. “When the Ugandan army attacked us,” said a former fighter under Dominic Ongwen, “they threw pictures of former LRA fighters,” referring to Ugandan army produced leaflets encouraging fighters to come out. “Dominic told us if we escaped and went to Uganda, the army would take our picture and then shoot us like they had done with the people pictured in the leaflets.” Even though the leaflets state clearly in three different languages that the people pictured are safe in Uganda, many people formerly with the LRA are illiterate or are told not to believe what is Ugandan government propaganda. Many do not know whether they would be killed or mistreated upon reaching Uganda.
Fear of being killed by civilians in Sudan, Congo, or CAR strongly influences the decision making of people in the LRA. Often, the seemingly senseless LRA violence against civilians is ordered by LRA commanders to precisely alienate local populations and discourage fighters from leaving. “Civilians came to the house of the chief where we surrendered and wanted to kill us,” said a former LRA who came out of the bush near Obo in CAR. “They said they wanted to kill the Ugandans, the real tongo-tongo” using the local Pazande word which means among other things “to chop,” a clear reference to the LRA’s use of machetes and axes against civilians. A former LRA fighter who came out near Duru in Congo around the end of July 2010 believed that another fighter who surrendered at the same time in a nearby location was lynched by the local population.
Finally, people formerly with the LRA dread returning to their areas of origin, afraid their communities will not accept them. “I was forced to kill my neighbours in front of everyone else,” said a former fighter who had been with the LRA for 13 years. “How can I go back?” The majority of the adult males who returned to Uganda in between July and September 2010 expressed a desire to remain in Gulu, the main town in northern Uganda, rather than return to their former communities. A recent survey of 116 former LRA combatants claims that 90 percent stated experiencing isolation and fear of revenge upon returning.
Among its recommendations, the report says the Ugandan army with the help of the United Nations missions in Congo and Sudan, and possibly with funding from the United States or the European Union, need to draw up a demobilization strategy aimed specifically at LRA combatants. Efforts by the United Nations Demobilization and Reintegration Department at MONUSCO to encourage defections are laudable, but the Ugandan army with the support of the Ugandan government has to take the lead in designing and implementing an effective demobilization strategy.
Stopping the pressure on former fighters to join the army ranks should be a priority for the Ugandan government. Ending illegal practices such as keeping former combatants in military custody for months should also be implemented rapidly. The issuing of amnesty certificates and reintegration packages should be resumed immediately, while the application of the Amnesty Act needs to be publicly clarified. Formal channels of integrating former combatants who wish to join the Ugandan army should also be established or reinstated.
But a strategy aimed at encouraging defections of LRA combatants, currently lacking in the Ugandan military effort, needs to go beyond simply ensuring that former combatants are not mistreated. A serious effort is needed to understand the internal dynamics of the LRA including the operational history of the organization and what drives certain commanders, especially those who are not indicted by the International Criminal Court, to remain in the LRA.