Sudan: Urgent Need to Define the North-South Border
By Peter Omondi
Khartoum, Sudan-- Sudan’s North and South must take political action to define their mutual boundary if they hope to avoid future complications, including a return to conflict.
Sudan: Defining the North-South Border, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, analyses how the still undefined boundary line has hindered implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), fuelled mistrust between its two signatory parties and contributed to heightened anxiety along the border. As the country’s oil resources are concentrated in these areas, the political and economic implications of border demarcation have been amplified, and some border areas remain dangerously militarised.
The CPA called for the border between the North and the semi-autonomous South to be demarcated within six months. Five years later, the task remains incomplete. The deliberations of the technical body tasked to draw the line have been exhausted and its work plagued by a poisoned atmosphere. While most of the border has been agreed, five specific areas are disputed on technical grounds; still others remain contested in the public arena. Breaking the border deadlock is no longer a task for technocrats, but for the political leaderships in Khartoum and Juba.
“A solution to the border is not only about drawing a line, but about defining the nature and management of that border and the future relations of communities on both sides”, says Zach Vertin, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Analyst. “Completing these two tasks would go a long way toward preventing the border from becoming a source of renewed conflict in the post-CPA era”.
Expectations and emotions are running high in advance of the January 2011 referendum, in which Southern Sudanese will decide whether to remain united with the North or to secede. Some border populations fear the outcome could result in a hardening of the border and thus be a threat to their livelihood. In negotiating post-referendum arrangements, the long-ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) must work to assuage these fears. Regardless of the referendum outcome, the parties should agree on a broad framework for cross-border arrangements, one that addresses citizenship, cross-border movement and seasonal migration, economic activity and security.
“Progress toward a mutually-beneficial package may lessen the potential impact of where exactly the disputed boundary is drawn in the end”, says Vertin.
True stability will also depend in part on the extent to which local actors feel they have had some role in defining future border management and trans-border relations. A framework should allow space for local agreements, and the NCP and SPLM should establish a channel through which border communities can feed directly in to the negotiations on cross-border arrangements.
“The ideal post-referendum scenario is one in which the parties and their border constituencies can achieve the softest border possible. If necessary, a joint monitoring mechanism may help to safeguard that border, as well as the rights and responsibilities of the people on both sides”, says E.J. Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Acting Africa Program Director. “Progress on these fronts will help to prevent Sudan, whether as one country or two, from falling back into conflict”.
The January 2011 referendum on self-determination could result in Sudan’s partition, and the country’s North-South border may ultimately become the world’s newest international boundary.
The sooner the parties break the border deadlock the better, though the process need not necessarily be completed prior to the referendum as Khartoum has argued previously. Furthermore, a solution to the border is about not only drawing a line, but also defining the nature and management of that border and the future relations of communities on both sides. A “soft” boundary is ideal, one backed by a framework for cross-border arrangements and, if necessary, safeguarded by a joint monitoring mechanism. Progress toward both demarcating and defining the border will prevent it from becoming a source of renewed conflict in the post-CPA era.
The governments in Khartoum and Juba alike rely heavily on oil revenues that derive primarily from the border lands. The concentration of resources there has amplified the political and economic dimensions of an already contentious task. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) have exhibited an aggressive military posture in some border areas. And many of the country’s trans-boundary populations – some of whom represent significant political constituencies – fear possible secession of the South could result in a hardening of the boundary and a threat to their livelihood.
This important issue has for far too long been tied up in the Technical Border Committee (TBC), the body mandated to demarcate the border as it stood at Independence Day in 1956. The committee’s extensive deliberations – as well as a poisoned atmosphere – have led to an impasse. Solid information regarding the process, the work of those tasked to undertake it and the disputed areas has been scarce, leading to considerable confusion and speculation among political elites, border communities and international partners. While the committee has agreed on most of the border, five specific areas are disputed on technical grounds; and others remain contested in the public arena. Any prolonged review of maps and records is unlikely to yield agreement on the disputed areas, underscoring that this is no longer a technical issue, but a political one, and should be treated as such.
The two parties that signed the CPA – the long ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – began critical negotiations on post-referendum arrangements in July 2010. Border demarcation is not an agenda item, but the issues of border management and cross-border relations will undoubtedly arise and be affected by several others that are, including citizenship, national resources, economic cooperation, grazing rights and security. Progress on these fronts may lessen the potential impact of where exactly the boundary is drawn in the end.
The type of border and its exact location could well become bargaining chips in a grander set of trade-offs that will define the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements. And, while not everyone will be satisfied in the end, stability along the border will depend in part on the extent to which local actors feel they have had some role in defining border management and trans-border relations. Border communities are among those most directly affected by the current atmosphere of post-referendum uncertainty; examination of the disputed areas illustrates that the border can mean very different things to political elites than it does to the communities who live on it.
It is essential to feed into the post-referendum negotiations the promising work county and state actors, as well as international partners, are doing to lay the foundation for future cross-border relations. The report recommends that the NCP and SPLM, in concert with the UN and international partners, should recognise that resolution of the outstanding border disputes is no longer a technical issue, but a political one. As such, the national presidency – possibly through the recently established joint committee headed by Pagan Amum (SPLM) and Salah Gosh (NCP) – should assume full responsibility for achieving a solution. It should also decide on an agency to implement the demarcation, agree to UN participation in that process, and act upon renewed commitments to resume demarcation in the undisputed areas.