East Africa Region on High Alert Following Kampala Bombings
By Peter Omondi
The attack—carried out by al-Shabaab, the Somali radical Islamic group—brought home the stark reality that radical Islamists operating in the lawless Horn of Africa nation which has been without an effective central government following the disintegration of the dictatorial regime of Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, have the ability of exporting their brand of terror across the East African region.
But the region did not the attacks lying down. Ugandan security forces have moved fast and have arrested dozens of suspects, some of whom have confessed to carrying out the attacks. In the meantime, Kenya has also intensified security patrols along its border with Somalia as Burundi, another country targeted by al-Shabaab, intensifies security within installations that could come under attack.
If the Kampala attack was aimed at intimidating President Yoweri Museveni into withdrawing Ugandan troops currently serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace keeping force, the terrorists must have hit the wrong target, for Museveni, who does not take threats kindly, is already digging in for a fight.
“We were just in Mogadishu to guard the port, the airport and state house. Now they have mobilised us to look for them”, Museveni said in reaction to the Kampala blasts, vowing that Uganda would never be cowed and has the capacity to send even 20,000 more troops to the war-torn country.
Irked by the attacks, the Ugandan called for a strong regional resolve to rout al-Shabaab and save the fledgling Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The calls seem to have been heeded as the top military echelons in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are now toying with the idea of launching a joint military attack on the Islamic extremists in Somalia before they pose more security threats to the region. The argument being advanced by the military high command in these countries is that the previous Ethiopian invasion largely failed because it was conducted unilaterally, without any support from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body that comprises seven member states from the East and Horn of Africa.
However, with the imminent danger posed by al-Shabaab, IGAD now wants to send 2000 more troops to Somalia. While this number will still not be enough to counter the threat posed by al-Shabaab, it will make a total of 8000 troops, the figure proposed by IGAD. AMISOM’s major problem has been lack of cash, with neither the African Union nor IGAD having enough money to support a large number of troops in Somalia. Unfortunately, IGAD’s appeal to the international community for US$1 billion for AMISOM has continued to fall on deaf ears. But if the AU’s recent appeal to the UN Security Council to take over Somali peacekeeping and turn AMISOM into a UN force is granted, the cash crisis will have been resolved and a stronger force deployed in Somalia. It is also encouraging to note that the US administration has pledged to work with the East African region to stem future attacks.
The situation may also improve following the recent UN Security Council sanctions on Eritrea, where al-Shabaab and other radical Islamists were previously based.
Whereas al-Shabaab targets Uganda and Burundi for contributing to AMISOM, Ethiopia is also at risk, given that its forces invaded Mogadishu in December 2006 to kick out the radical Islamists. This explains why one of the Kampala targets was a popular Ethiopian restaurant. Still, Ethiopia has a long history with the Somali conflict and has on numerous occasions had to contend with rebellion from Ethiopian Somalis living in the vast Ogaden Province. Kenya has also had similar problems in the early years of its independence, starting with the secessionist campaign by the Somali-speaking North Eastern Province.
This time round, however, Kenya is being targeted buy al-Shabaab for trying suspected Somali pirates, under an arrangement with the EU which has pledged US$9.3 million to help Kenya, Tanzania and Seychelles prosecute suspected pirates. For the last 20 years, the lawless Somalia has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the cases of piracy off its coastline. The lucrative piracy business-- paying off millions of dollars in ransom—has been a threat to international shipping and a hindrance to the delivery of food aid shipments since the second phase of the Somali civil war in the 21st century.
Despite the crisis in Somalia, there is some light at the end of the tunnel. The International Contact Group on Somalia- an informal gathering of diplomats from the UN, US, the EU, the Arab world and African states (including IGAD) has been at the forefront of championing peace efforts in Somalia, with the 17th meeting having been held from 21 – 22 April 2010 in Cairo, Egypt. Kenya has been at the forefront of seeking a lasting peace in Somalia, having midwifed the peace talks leading to the formation of the first TFG in exile in Nairobi. Kenya has notably borne the heaviest brunt of the Somali conflict with refugees arriving in droves and its porous borders leading to the proliferation of small arms.
But even as the international community steps in, much will depend on the goodwill of the Somalis themselves. The US counterterrorism policy, for instance, has failed miserably and polarised the already fragile nation even further. It appears the main objective of US counter-terrorism policy in the Horn of Africa was to apprehend suspected terrorists and stop the spread of home and foreign grown radicalism spreading in the region and beyond, rather than making a priority of the restoration of order and a stable government in Somalia. Notably, the US policy under the Bush administration helped push the crisis in Somalia to catastrophic dimensions.