Why peace may not hold
Sounds of drumbeats reverberated across the capacity-filled Nairobi’s Nyayo National Stadium on Sunday 9 January 2005. As Southern Sudanese women gyrated to the pulsating African drumbeats, their male counterparts put their best feet forward, if only to do a jig. Others simply shed tears of joy. Amid wild ululations and chants of Allahu Akbar (God is great) and Halleluia, the world watched as the Sudanese government and the former rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army [SPLM/A] signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end the war that had dogged Africa’s largest country for almost 22 years, killing 2 million people and displacing 4 million others. But as the world joined Sudan in celebrating a new dawn, the question that remained on the lips of observers was: “Will peace hold in Sudan?” For a country that has witnessed five coups since independence, one could not rule out the possibility of scuttling the peace process by some vested interests.
Two years down the line, and true to analysts’ predictions, signs are that the CPA could be facing imminent collapse. “It is the feeling of every southerner that the implementation of the CPA is proceeding at a snail’s pace”, says Moses Lemi, Logistics Manager with the Humanitarian Assistance for Southern Sudan (HASS)—one of the humanitarian agencies working in the country. Whereas the agreement ended one of Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil wars, it was an agreement between only two parties—SPLM and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and continues to lack broader support throughout the country, particularly in the North. “The current equation for peace in Sudan is a worrying one: the NCP has the capacity to implement but lacks the political will, whereas the SPLM has the commitment but is weak and disorganised. There is a real risk of renewed conflict down the road unless the NCP begins to implement the CPA in good faith, and the SPLM becomes a stronger and more effective implementing partner”, says the report, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The long road ahead, published by the International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent, non-profit, organization working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Part of the reason peace may not hold is the suspicion with which the north and south have been treating each other. Though leaders from both the north and south vowed to commit themselves to a new Sudan, suspicion between the north and south remains high. Torn down the middle by religion, lifestyle and the quest for wealth, politicians from the two regions have never trusted each other. Even as the CPA was being signed, suspicion was in top gear. Southerners, for instance, were not happy with the invitation of former president Jaffer Numeiry to the singing ceremony in Nairobi. Numeiry is seen as the architect of the division between the north and south. Suspicion is also rife that President Omar al-Bashir still continues to fund, arm and control the southern militias, who, during the war, fought the SPLM alongside government forces.
Notably, soon after the signing of the peace accord in Nairobi, al- Bashir hurriedly promoted 300 officers, some to the rank of major general. Despite efforts by former Kenya’s president Daniel arap Moi, through his Moi Africa Institute, the militia men have not reconciled with the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and continue to unleash terror along the Juba-Bor-Juba-Torit-Nimor roads. “Unless this thorny issue of insecurity is addressed urgently, Sudan may not see a lasting peace”, says Lemi.
Since independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, Sudan has been engulfed in civil wars in the south, the first being the Anyanya rebellion between 1956-1972, which ended with the Addis Ababa accord of 1972.This was followed by a decade of relative peace and stability in the south, which enjoyed a large measure of self-rule under semi-autonomous governance status from the central government in Khartoum, as granted by the Accord.During this period, the south experienced robust socio-political and democratic self-awakening and awareness and a large measure of economic development and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. But all this came to an abrupt end in 1983 with the onset of the second phase of the civil war.
The main reason for the break out of the second war was the political and economic marginalisation of the south, especially over natural resources. Others were the deliberate exclusion of the south from centers of political power and economics, commerce and industry, the military, security system and the intelligentsia. This divide was worsened by the abrupt imposition of Islamic sharia laws in Sudan to the dismay of the south by the military strong man Gen Numeiry in 1983.
By signing the CPA, both parties brought to an end an intense, complex and intensive negotiation period. To most analysts, the Nairobi peace agreement is the most comprehensive and detailed in Africa, second only to the South African peace settlement of between 1990-1994.The CPA was the culmination of more than two and a half years of negotiation between the then insurgent SPLM/A and the NCP. It provides for a six- year interim period with democratic elections by 2009, and an autonomous southern government, followed by a self-determination referendum for the South. In the interim, it mandates power and wealth sharing arrangements aimed at ending decades of political and economic marginalisation of the South and guaranteeing its representation in Sudan federal government’s branches proportional to its population.
According to the CPA, the SPLM controls 70 per cent of the appointed positions in the GoSS until elections, the NCP 10 per cent, and other southern parties the remaining 20 per cent. At the level of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the NCP maintains 52 per cent of the appointed positions, the SPLM 28 per cent, other northern parties 14 per cent, and other southern parties 6 per cent. The SPLM must also establish 10 new state governments in the South (where it will maintain its 70 per cent control, with 20 per cent going to the NCP and 10 per cent to other parties), and fill 45 per cent of the positions in the state governments of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and 20 per cent in all other northern state governments.
But as the ICG says in its report, the CPA is a long and complex agreement, and hence difficult to monitor effectively. With more than 50 national bodies and commissions to be formed, multiple systems and levels of governments (with the GoSS and southern state governments to be formed almost from scratch), the parties, partners and observers are understandably overwhelmed. Without universally accepted criteria for assessing implementation, there is an active debate amongst both the parties and observers on the interpretation of the implementation process – for while much has happened little has changed.
One of the key protocols yet to be implemented, according to Lemi, is that on the Abyei Boundary Commission. It may be recalled that during negotiations for the CPA, there were incessant disagreements over power sharing. Notably, control of the three disputed regions namely the Southern Blue Nile, Nuba mountains and Abyei remained a major sticking point in the peace process. The expansive southern territory covers three provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr-El Ghazal and Equitoria, according to the provincial boundaries defined by the colonialists at Sudan’s independence in January 1956. However, the realities of the war made the northern regions of Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan, Abyei and southern Blue Nile part of southern Sudan. Whereas the SPLM/A insisted they are southern areas, the Khartoum government maintained that they are northern regions. At one time in January 2004, hopes of a peace settlement in the near future were dimmed when president al Bashir ruled out any chances of a deal over the three disputed areas, saying that the talks with southern rebels had no authority to settle the status of the three regions. The Boundary Commission that was to resolve this issue has done nothing so far.
Still, Dr Garang’s death in July 2005 contributed a great deal to the slow pace of the implementation of the peace deal. Following his death, SPLM’s vision has remained blurred, with the NCP abandoning its strategy for a political partnership with the SPLM, as clearly manifested at recent celebrations to mark the second anniversary of the CPA, when President al-Bashir and his Southern Sudan counterpart Salva Kiir accused each other in public of sabotaging the implementation of the peace deal. Fears abound that following Garang’s death, peace may not hold in Sudan as no leader within the SPLM/A has the requisite diplomatic skills as well as respect of southern military field commanders – qualities that enabled Garang negotiate for the CPA. Analysts observe that full compliance with the CPA – a complicated agreement - may not be possible under certain circumstances depending on the political dynamics in the country. Notably, matters could be compounded by lack of political will or resistance from elements within the two parties.
The fears have been exacerbated by what observers see as Garang’s major weakness - his failure to delegate duties, a factor that made it difficult for potential successors to gain the necessary leadership experience. Consequently, the SPLM is facing enormous challenges, which are severely undermining its ability to function as an effective partner in government. The SPLM faces two simultaneous tasks: as the lead party in the new autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the minority partner in the new Government of National Unity (GNU). Still, the GoSS is also facing some acute threats, most noticeably from the lack of progress on reorganising the SPLA into a professional army, and the extended delays in paying its troops and civil servants.
It is also noteworthy that the bulk of the agreement was directly negotiated by then First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and Dr Garang, aided by a small group of trusted aides, with the two leaders counting on their positive personal relationship to overcome obstacles.
The major problem, however, remains among the southerners, with the survival of the SPLM/A increasingly coming under threat. Yet, a split within its ranks could bring an end to the CPA and embroil the whole region in total devastation. Besides, the ongoing conflict in Darfur has distracted the attention of the international community from the CPA, as predicted by observers during the signing of the CPA.. Until recently, the Darfur crisis was seen as a sideshow to a much larger problem, the 21- year war between government and rebel forces in the south of Sudan. But independent observers now warn that the gains made so far will be minimised if the violence in the west is allowed to continue unchecked. “The Darfur cloud is going to cast a dark shadow over the joy of today’s agreement”, said John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group think-tank. “The rapid disintegration in Darfur will complicate the implementation of this agreement. The international community will need to be very vigilant on all issues, especially on oil revenue and wealth sharing”, he added. "It would be a terrible tragedy if peace in the south were to be achieved just as Sudan enters a new and equally vicious war in Darfur," said Justice Africa, a UK-based think-tank. "As well as humanitarian assistance, the Darfur war needs immediate political attention by the international community."
Yet, a lasting peace in the south is what stakeholders are yearning for. The successful implementation of the protocols will be a major boost to Kenya, which has been hosted the peace talks for more than two years. Indeed, Kenya – which has borne the brunt of the conflict in the form of influx of refugees and proliferation of small arms – would like to see a fruitful implementation of the agreement.
Equally keen on a fruitful implementation of the peace deal is the international community, including the US, EU, Norway and Italy among others, who supported the peace process both morally and financially. By sending representatives to witness the signing ceremony, they were sending a clear message that they supported a lasting peace.