Media and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: which way for the African media?

On seeing the ubiquitous TV images of waste dumps, sombre looking black children and dead bodies following the horrors of hurricane Katrina in the US, some bloggers and phone-in enthusiasts in Africa confessed that they initially thought that this was another catastrophe taking place on the continent. Well, this is not entirely surprising given that in the content of the Western media, Africa is often reduced to all things bad: disease, war, violence, famine and total chaos. As it is, one could argue that this negative picture is what audiences in and outside of Africa have been conditioned to expect of media reportage on Africa.

In attempting to undo this negative reportage, an interesting mix of unlikely bedfellows journalists, media owners, business, academics, civil society activists and leaders in Africa have in recent years underscored the need for media in Africa to take ownership of the African story. During the 2003 Media in Africa conference at Stellenbosch University, Philip Molefe, head of the South African based satellite channel, SABC Africa argued that “the major challenge facing the media in Africa is the ownership of the African story.

It is a known fact that the story of Africa continues to be packaged and edited in London, Paris and Atlanta” (Molefe 2003: 1). Molefe was echoing a theme previously highlighted by South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki during the 2003 South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) Conference. Mbeki called upon editors from across the continent to counter the negative images and to facilitate knowledge and understanding of the continent by reporting “Africa to Africans” and reporting “Africa as Africans” (Mbeki 2003:1-3). This is of course in line with he’s 1990s emphasis on the ‘African renaissance’ in reference to the rebirth of African self-respect and unity, the ideals of which can be found in the more recent New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative.

Such positions concerning what we refer to as the Africanisation of media reportage about Africa are clearly justified. However, it must be said that inherent in such appeals are the uncritical assumptions that African journalists by virtue of their being imbued with some self sense of being African – ‘ubuntu’ – and their specific geographical location/position on the continent, will report on Africa in a more positive and informed way than Western journalists.

The fuller point here is that notions of ‘telling the African story’ and reporting ‘Africa as Africans’ that are central to current debates concerning media content on/for Africa and the role of the African media have not been sufficiently analysed.

Problematising these issues prompts us to ask questions such as:
a) What is the African story?
b) What does it mean to report Africa as Africans?
c) In whose interests is it to report Africa as Africans?
To make sense of these questions we decided to take a look at the recent reportage on NEPAD by the media in Africa. Our interest in NEPAD is based on the supposition that it is a pertinent African story among many in as far as it broadly deals with the interdependent issues of development and democracy, both of which are inextricably linked to Africa’s most chronic problems.

Here, the ‘African story’ means inclusive and locally produced stories that address African relationships and practices – continental or diasporic – from a diverse range of African perspectives. This open rather than exclusivist approach towards the ‘African story’ is influenced by the view that such stories should, for instance, work towards opening up the public’s participation in policy-making by informing them about initiatives like NEPAD whilst also providing an open forum for their inclusion, debate and discussion on such issues (Kupe 2005).

Briefly, NEPAD, which – in its terms – is aimed at poverty eradication and the entry of Africa into the global economy, is the ‘African-owned’ and ‘African led’ development vision of the African Union. Specific objectives include:
- investment in key sectors such as ICTs,
- good governance through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and
- regional cooperation.

The APRM enables member states to police each other on issues of political, economic and corporate governance (NEPAD 2001). With regard to the media, although journalists are to be consulted during the peer reviews, NEPAD is for the most part silent on media freedoms as key criteria for good governance (Berger 2002; IFEX 2005).

Despite its promises of transforming African development and governance, NEPAD has been criticised for the neo-liberal ideology that underpins its development, evolution and mode of deployment (Bond 2002; Adesina 2004). In addition, having excluded the unions, civil society and religious groups in drawing up its framework, the initiative has been criticised for being elitist and exclusionary- all of which is in opposition to its ‘African-owned’ credentials' (Nyong’o et al. 2002).

Hence, Bond (2002), Taylor and Nel (2002) and Adesina (2004) question NEPAD and its precursor the ‘African Renaissance’ on the grounds that they are an extension of neo-liberalism and the failed macro-economic policies of – structural adjustment and tied aid – the ‘Washington Consensus’[1]. It is in this regard that NEPAD is also read as a cover for regional hegemons and as an enactment of South African sub-imperialism due to the dramatic entry of SA corporate capital into the rest of Africa under the policies of NEPAD (Bond 2002; Adesina 2004; Lesufi 2006).

African media coverage of NEPAD: events and the APRM
In our analysis of African media coverage on NEPAD between January and July 2005 based on a selection of African newspapers and news providers available through Allafrica.com, the leading trends in the reportage included:
- event-based coverage
- a predominant focus on the APRM and
- the dominance of elite, male news sources.
Overall, out of the 101 stories, Nigerian newspapers reported most elaborately on NEPAD. This was followed by South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda and Ghana. NEPAD was less visible in countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Sierra Leone. The significantly high coverage of NEPAD in South Africa and Nigeria is not entirely surprising given that both countries are leading champions of NEPAD and key regional political and economic powers.

Coverage of NEPAD was most intense during those periods when there was an event such as a regional summit, national peer review session and or project launch. While events remain important, development and democratic initiatives are driven by processes. Events are only the trends within the processes. Reportage needs to take into account the processes underpinning the events.

The APRM was the most frequently reported topic. Other topics of reporting included, economic performance and ICTs (e-schools). Lesser topics included poverty, agriculture, health with gender issues as the least reported. The focus on the APRM is potentially at the expense of other initiatives. In fact, even the reportage on the APRM was limited to issues of political governance with little focus on corporate and economic governance which are equally important aspects of the review process.

In thinking about the APRM, it is worth noting that signing up to its processes is voluntary and open to all member states of the African Union (AU). By the time of the AU summit in Khartoum, Sudan, in January 2006, only 26 out of the 53 member states had signed up to be assessed

Countries that have acceded to the APRM as of March 2006 are Algeria,Cameroon, Rwanda, Angola, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Senegal, Lesotho, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria, Benin, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, Egypt, Tanzania, Mali, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sao Tome & Principe, and Mauritius. (Source NEPAD)
Overall, in return for upholding the conditions of the APRM – which is used as a criterion by donors to inform their considerations about partnerships with Africa – donors in the West are expected to provide increased foreign direct investments (FDI), aid, debt relief and fairer trade access to enable Africa to meet the Millennium Development Goals (Kotze and Steyn 2003:109; Herbert 2002).

For instance, with regard to NEPAD’s focus towards ICTs and bridging the digital divide through initiatives such as the e-schools project, it is those countries that have acceded to the APRM that have been prioritised in the rollout of the project (see Dawes 2004; Mutaizibwa 2004).

In addition, while some African leaders such as Olsegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki appear to have constructed and then bought into the dominant discourse on NEPAD, others such as Abdoulaye Wade and indeed some governments such as Namibia and Botswana – both of which are better performers in terms of development and governance in comparison to other African countries – are taking on a negotiated reading that accepts the basic premises while challenging certain aspects of NEPAD with Namibia in particular arguing that it has already got in place structures that are in line with the APRM.

Others that are evidently low on the scale towards reform such as Zimbabwe have taken on an oppositional stance towards the APRM which is in this case seen as an a condition that is being pushed onto Africa by the West. For others, including those that have acceded to the APRM – such as Gabon, Cameroon and the DRC – but are yet to go through the actual review process, the peer review potentially buys them time to stave off genuine reform because they can claim that they are participating (see Herbert 2004).[2]

Sources, trends and issues
The most frequent sources relied on were officials attached to the NEPAD and APRM secretariats and the various national steering committees. Heads of State and ministers were for the most part represented as the active parties – doing things, appealing for funds, blasting those standing in the way of Africa’s interests – they are the ones who got to ‘do’ NEPAD, ‘advocate’ and ‘speak’ out on behalf of and for NEPAD’s interests (‘Obasanjo blasts foreign nations over looted funds’ Daily Champion 21/06/05; ‘Museveni to launch first e-school’ New Vision 15/07/05).

Business sources in particular – NEPAD Business Forums in Nigeria and South Africa, CEO’s of ICT and Banking firms and potential investors were, for the most part, represented as voices of and for investment and trade in Africa through NEPAD (‘NAICOM banks on NEPAD for improved Penetration’ Daily Champion 10/05/05; ‘NEPAD: 127 Billion pension available in 14 countries’ The New Times, 29/04/05). Civil society organisations and representatives – (unions, advocacy and grassroots) were less frequently cited. They were frequently represented in a responding rather than defining role. They are the ones who deliberate on the implications of the already made decisions (‘Civil society deliberates on AU + NEPAD’ The Standard, Sierra Leone 21/01/05).

In addition, the face of NEPAD is predominantly male- 61%. Press releases accounted for 25% of the main sources whilst women clocked in at 14%. The absence of women as news actors in the reportage rather reflects the invisibility of gender issues within NEPAD’s initiatives. Of all the stories that we looked at, only one specifically focused on gender: ‘NEPAD to launch gender task force’ (BuaNews 10/07/05).

From our in-depth reading of the news texts on NEPAD we found that the bulk of the stories could be read as being ‘neutral’ about NEPAD. However, some stories were particularly supportive (‘Why NEPAD’s attempt to eradicate poverty will succeed’ This Day 20/1/2005) whilst others were critical (‘NEPAD comes up short 3 years later’ The East African Standard 9/1/2005). NEPAD has expressed concern about its negative portrayal in the African press with strong calls for positive coverage (see NEPAD 2004).

For instance, following the June 2005 presentation of the review reports for Ghana and Rwanda at the third summit of the APRM forum in Abuja, Nigeria, the APRM secretariat felt that the press had only focused on the ‘shortcomings identified in the review reports’ whilst ignoring the positives and that may be the press also lacked a proper understanding of the review process:

The press can and should educate the masses on the positive aspects of the process and highlight the very good and positive developments happening in the African continent (NEPAD 2005:3). The problem with such an expectation is that it could easily work towards the stifling of media criticism towards NEPAD whilst also reinforcing the self-serving interests of business, governments and the cultural elite in NEPAD at the cost of the interests and rights of the wider African publics and communities.
Implications for African media

In light of the aforementioned problematics about ‘telling the Africa story’ and ‘reporting Africa as Africans’, what can we make of the trends and issues concerning NEPAD’s reportage. The above trends in reportage clearly do raise some serious question marks about its ‘African owned’ and ‘African led’ credentials. The implication of the skew in news sources and social actors is for NEPAD to remain perceived and represented as a plan of, for and by the elite, with little ownership from other stakeholders in society. Evidently, this also raises doubts about its ‘African story’ credentials- this looks more like a story by and for the African elite.

In thinking about an African media for African stories concerning NEPAD, this leads us to raise two potential insights/challenges concerning the African media-NEPAD nexus.

Firstly, bearing in mind NEPAD’s elite orientation, the challenge here is for the media to tell the NEPAD story in such a way that brings on board the diversity and plurality of African voices in the debates and discussions concerning the initiative. The challenge for the African journalist is to tell this story, without simply becoming a ‘guard dog’ for the interests of the elite at the exclusion of the wider publics.

The suggestion here is for the media to take up journalism and media communication strategies that make room for a bottom up – participatory communication – approach towards the reportage on NEPAD. This could go along way towards making NEPAD more inclusive, representative and participatory all of which has the potential to make it a more genuine African development initiative that is not simply regurgitating the already failed one size fits all policies of neo-liberalism but one that is based on economic policies that are devised by the actual recipients of development in African.
Secondly, in attempting to make NEPAD more participatory it is pertinent for the African media and journalists to be wary of excessive self-congratulation, promotion, Afro-optimism and self-involvement all of which could stifle criticism of the initiative. The fuller point here is that taking on a critical and analytical stance in the coverage of NEPAD does not necessarily preclude appealing emotionally to people as Africans and or portraying NEPAD positively thereby bringing more people on board its ‘African-owned’ credentials and the related peer review process.

The idea here is to tell the NEPAD story in such a way that is interesting, inclusive, appealing and or in a way that rectifies the distorted image of Africa in the news, whilst also pointing out its shortfalls and successes and their implications for the daily lived experiences of Africans.

References
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