SA v China - 'Scramble for Zim'

Is Zimbabwe’s future about to be decided in Pretoria and/or in Beijing? The question is prompted by a recent visit to South Africa by a high-level Zimbabwean delegation seeking rescue from the startling possibility that Harare faces expulsion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (as of late June Zimbabwe was $306 million in arrears to the IMF); and from President Robert Mugabe’s visit to Beijing on July 23 for talks on a rescue package for his regime.
China and South Africa share international criticism for their support of Mugabe: China for being the only member of the UN Security Council not to condemn Mugabe’s atrocities, and President Thabo Mbeki for his “quiet diplomacy”, now universally seen as open support for Mugabe. The two countries in this sense are in the same predicament. It would make sense for them to put pressure on Mugabe to give the appearance at least of making his regime look less oppressive: not for the sake of Zimbabwe’s population, but for the image of China and SA.

It could be in Mugabe’s interests to play along. A necessary move would be for him to talk to Zimbabwe’s opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Talking could cost him nothing. Knowing Mugabe he could turn it into no more than a gesture. Somewhat more difficult for him would be to issue and order a halt to the present “clean up” campaign. His repressive regime could halt the demolition of houses and shacks and still remain repressive. And China and South Africa would in effect be granted international permission to bail him out.

China’s interests in Zimbabwe were cemented in 1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence. Since then ties between the two countries have been tightened steadily. Today China is Harare’s single largest investor. It has helped to construct the Harare stadium, hospitals, dams, schools, wells, clothing factories, and in the reconstruction of the Iron and Steel Corporation while China’s International Water and Electric company is contracted to farm 250,000 acres of agricultural land in return for, it is rumoured, payment in tobacco.

China has offered credit lines to Zimbabwe’s small and medium enterprises, and it is also financing and providing mining equipment to an expansion project of Zimbabwe’s Electricity Supply Authority and Hwange Colliery, in return for which China has coal and coke concessions. Militarily, China has provided Zimbabwe with six K8 jet aircraft, a radar system for Mugabe’s personal residence and other military hardware estimated to cost around US$240m.

In return Beijing gets a firm foothold in Africa, and with Zimbabwe’s increasing isolation and dwindling economy, a golden opportunity to unearth Zimbabwe’s prize possessions: its natural resources. Zimbabwe has the second largest deposits of platinum in the world, estimated at over $500bn. It also has gold, silver, copper and other valuable minerals.

Beijing will continue to support Harare, while extending its grip on Zimbabwe’s natural resources. Without competition from Western firms, Zimbabwe could become China’s most important resource base in Africa – as long as Mugabe is president anyway.

South Africa also has to be taken into the equation: its immediate help would be to pay Eskom to continue to supply electricity to Zimbabwe, and to pay for grain and fuel provided by SA distributors. The visiting delegation reportedly requested a US$1 billion line of credit from Pretoria - which seems almost certain to be granted.

Analysts are asking whether Mbeki and Beijing will be partners or rivals in what is almost a new “scramble for Zimbabwe”.

There would be some rivalry, but the odds are that they will work in tandem: both have too much to gain and too much to lose by not doing so. Evidence of the growing concern of China's move into Africa is reflected by a report in the Johannesburg Business Day, which quotes (among others) political analyst Nic Borain as saying: “SA would not want to lose its geo-strategic influence in the Southern African Development Community to China and this might be a push factor for SA to exercise leverage.” How much of its financial and political independence Zimbabwe will retain after China and Mbeki have staked out their claims is still to be seen.